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Abstract 
It is estimated that the gains to global welfare from a modest increase in migration greatly outweigh the gains to we(fare 
from any further trade liberalization. Yet, migration remains an ill-understood and under-researched instrument of 
developmenr. In fact, only recently has the liberalization of labour markets been discussed in the same policy-oriented way 
as the liberalization of goods or capital markets. 
This address will present an analytical .framework for thinking about economic migration and explore the channels through 
which development outcomes eventuate. It will distinguish between permanent and tempora1y migration flows and outline 
the policy challenges faced in both forms of movements. Both sending and receiving countries have a role to play in 
ensuring that migration policies are development friendly while remaining market-driven. In particular, it will highlight the 
market failures that plague the temporary movement of people and keep such movements at sub-optima/levels world-wide. 
These market failures are particularly onerous for the small fragile states of the Pacific that seek to improve the economic 
outcomes of their citizens through regional integration but are faced with the challenges of geography and size. Given the 
importance of promoting more pro-poor migration globally and in the Pacific, this keynote will outline the policy and 
institutional underpinnings that are needed to facilitate tempor01y programs for the poor. 
Introduction 
There is strong evidence now showing that labor market 
restrictions are imposing a much greater burden on the 
global economy than the remaining trade restrictions. 
Through general equilibrium models it has been estimated 
that complete and free migration of labor could double 
global incomes whereas a feasible increase in migration 
would increase income worldwide by $772 billion in 2025 1• 
When correcting for price changes faced and caused by 
these movements, the gains approximate to $356 billion 
which is a 0.6% increase in global income. Lest we dismiss 
this is too small, it helps to note that this figure is about 
three times all official development assistance and dwarfs 
the expected gains from all remaining trade liberalization. 
This increase would also translate into a slightly more 
favorable distribution for developing countries as their 
share of aggregate gain is 1. 8 percent, whereas the gain to 
native high-income countries is 0.4 percent relative to the 
baseline. 
What are the channels through which these labour mobility 
related welfare gains and losses work themselves through 
the economy? The main aim of this paper is to identify 
those channels of influence using a production-function 
framework to position the analytic arguments and empirical 
findings where available. 
Analytical Framework, Empirical Findings 
and Policy Implications 
The framework adopted here follows a traditional 
·production function' approach where improvements in 
economic welfare can be thought of as resulting from 
movements along the production function or fi·om pushing 
out the production fi·ontier. These movements can occw· for 
any of the following reasons: (i) there has been an increase 
in the amount of total resoW"ces available - either la boW" or 
capital resources, (ii) there is an improvement in the way 
resources are combined or allocated (iii) externalities 
emerge from migration which can be captured. I use this to 
organize the analytic and empirical findings for both, 
migrant-sending as well as migrant-receiving countries. 
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A. Migrant-sending point of view (Pacific) 
i) Increase in amount of resources available 
Remittances are monies or goods sent home to family 
members or communities by migrants that live and work in 
other countries. The exp01t of labor results in a national loss 
of the abundant factor but frequently results in an inflow of 
capital through remittances. In a simple world, if the 
productivity of labor is low in labor abundant countries, 
then an injection of capital through remittances should 
improve the productivity of labor that remains behind by 
virtue of it being combined with more productive capital. If 
there is an improvement in labor market conditions due to 
the depatture of some excess labor then that would fwther 
increase the benefits to domestic resident labor. And if 
these additional capital resources respond positively to 
adverse economic conditions (i.e. are counter cyclical) as 
they are often preswned to be, then the injection is even 
more precious because it comes at a time when the country 
needs it most - unlike private capital which may pull out ~ 
adverse times and make bad economic conditions worse. -
To add to this. there may be multiplier effects if the 
economy is demand-constrained and remittances could 
increase the output of many sectors. 
The impact of remittances of migrant-sending communities 
is not n·ivial and evidence is growing worldwide that 
remittances have had a deep and far reaching positive 
impact on immediate household members as well as 
broader communities. In an eff01t to understand the size and 
impact of remittances in the Pacific we commissioned 
household level surYeys in Fiji and Tonga where over 900 
households answered detailed questions on their household 
characteristics. migration behavior. size and frequency of 
remittances. the household's spending patterns and broader 
socio-economic status.3 These surveys have been analyzed 
and have pointed to the following main results that show 
that: 
• 
• 
The amount of resources received in these countries 
through remittances are significant. In Tonga, over 
90% of the households surveyed received 
remittances in comparison with 43% of households 
in the Fijian sample. Among remittance receivers, 
Tongan households receive and average of US3,067 
in comparison with US 1 ,328 in Fiji. 
The positive impact of remittances on poverty 
reduction is strong using a variety of measures of 
deprivation. After taking remittances into account, 
all measures of relative deprivation improve, with 
different intensities in rural and urban areas. 
However. it would be too simplistic to asswne that that the 
loss of one resource - labor, is fully compensated for by an 
increase in another resource - capital, and I will return to 
this issue again. From the perspective of assessing the 
impact of increased resources on the economy, at least three 
questions come to mind which point to the potentially 
negative effects of remittances. 
Do remittances suffer from the problems associated with 
resource rents? This refers to the "curse of natural 
resources" where windfall gains from natural resources like 
oil or timber have tended to impede governance and 
modernization in most countries by taking away the 
pressures that push for broad-based growth. There are at 
least two very fundamental differences between remittances 
and resource revenues which should lead to very different 
outcomes. First, natural resource income is of a large 
magnitude and highly concentrated in the hands of a few, 
creating a pocket of powerful rent-seekers whereas 
remittances are small and widely dispersed in the country; 
and second remittances avoid the government as 
' . 
middleman which resource-rents cannot, thus allowmg the 
middleman to follow arbitrary policies which may promote 
corruption and retard growth. 
Are remittance inflows akin to aid inflows which also 
increase capital resources available to a country? In 
particular, can remittances cause inflation, overvaluation of 
the exchange rate and render the tradable sector 
uncompetitive? Economists call this the "Dutch disease" 
where the effect of large inflows of foreign exchange is that 
the exchange rate appreciates making exports 
uncompetitive in world markets hence doing a disservice to 
productive sectors in general. The difference however is 
that typically remittances are small and grow slowly over 
time making the effects also small and the time period long 
enough to allow other sectors to adjust. Where this is not 
the case. and Fiji (rather than Tonga or Samoa) may fit that 
description recently, there is the possibility of adverse 
impacts of exchange rate appreciations. Overall however, 
aid and remittances are not to be equated. Whereas aid is an 
extemal injection into the economy and raises all sorts of 
questions about ownership, capacity. and governance -
remittances are not really that different from any other 
export income for its citizens where the export is the service 
being performed outside of the national borders. In fact , 
when remittances are treated as income in the calculation of 
debt/GDP and debt/export income ratios of countries, these 
ratios drop quite significantly thus raising the credit-
worthiness of these countries in international financial 
markets and fwther improving access to capital (World 
Bank. 2006, p. 1 02). 
The third question relates to the impact of remittances on 
household labor supply. Do households that receive 
remittances work less? Economists call this the "backward 
bending supply curve" response where increased income 
does not cause more labor to be forthcoming and 
individuals choose leisure instead or work. 4 It is possible 
that remittance receiving members of the household may 
raise their reservation wage and prefer to stay out of the 
labor market but the evidence from Philippines, Guatemala 
and Jamaica shows that remittance receiving hcuseholds 
tend to invest more in education, i.e. opt for more schooling 
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instead of working early; as well as show evidence of 
reduction in child labor and an increase in self-employment. 
Similar evidence from the Pacific is discussed in the next 
section which pertains to the decisions surrounding the 
allocation of resources. 
Policy implications 
Can policy help increase the inflow of remittances? Since 
remittances are essentially a person-to-person transfer 
shaped by family ties and shared cultural values, it is hard 
to think of policy measures that make migrants send more 
money home. While the flow of remittances will vary with 
the changing circumstances of individuals and families, a 
larger migrant stock would in general be con-elated with 
larger remittances. Holding other parameters constant, 
temporary workers are also likely to remit more to their 
home countries than permanent workers, and this point is 
taken up later on. 
Beyond enhanced labor mobility in general, a reduction in 
the transaction cost of making financial n·ansfers would 
ensure that recipients get most of what is sent to them. 
Evidence points to unduly high n·ansaction costs in many 
corridors although global best practice puts it at about 3 
percent. Further, the size of remittances is estimated to be 
highly elastic w.r.t. costs, hence a reduction in cost of one 
percent is likely to induce more than a 1% increase in 
remittances (Gibson, et al. , 2006). A lowering of costs in 
the formal financial system, would also enable senders to 
use formal channels rather than inf01mal channels -- such as 
mailing or personal deliveries -- and this would allow better 
data to be recorded and enable central banks to make 
necessary changes to monetary policy when needed. 
ii) Improvement in allocation of resources 
In addition to the static effects stemming from the increased 
remittance resources, migration may be able to influence 
the way resources are allocated, both at the aggregate level 
as well as at the level of the household. At the aggregate 
level , remittances can alter the allocation of resources 
among groups of households by changing the underlying 
disn·ibution of income. At the micro level of the household, 
the prospect of migration and the subsequent receipt of 
remittances can have profound effects on the allocation of 
income towards consumption or investment. We take up 
these effects in turn. 
In countries where the poor have migration options. 
remittances tend to benefit the poorest and hence result in 
reducing income inequalities. When the relatively well-off 
migrate. or where migration is skewed towards the highly 
skilled, income inequality may worsen. As income 
distribution changes, so does access to assets such as capital 
equipment or land and the fmal outcome of how labor, land 
and capital are combined in productive activities, but it has 
not been possible to empirically map out these effects yet. 
In fact , even measuring income inequality itself poses some 
methodological challenges. Measures such as the Gini 
coefficient may remain unchanged despite the fact that the 
shape of the underlying distribution curve changes. Fwther, 
such measures cannot take into account the fact that 
different cohorts of people may go in and out of certain 
income quintiles making it necessary to use panel data 
which is very hard to come by. Through household survey 
data collected in the Pacific we are able to show that 
remittances and other unrequited internal n·ansfers have a 
strong positive impact on income distribution. In Tonga, the 
poorest 40% of the population's share of cash income 
increases from 7.3% to 18.7%, and the share of the richest 
20% falls from almost 63% to less than 50%. In Fiji the 
impact is also positive but weaker than in Tonga as one 
would expect given fewer remittance-receiving households, 
where the share of the poorest 40% increases from 9% to 
11.6%, and the share of the richest 20 % of the population 
falls from 57.8% to 53.8%. 
At the individual or household leveL several studies have 
looked for a direct link between remittances and the 
consumption-investment mix of household expenditures. 
and jownalistic references to the issue have often criticized 
the preponderance of remittance-funded consumption. 
There are important reasons to question the validity ofthese 
vtews. 
from a welfare perspective. an extra dollar of investment is 
only better than an extra dollar of present conswnption if 
the marginal social value of investment is greater than its 
marginal private value. At lov,, levels of income - or when 
there is great volatility of income - access to a steady and 
reliable sow-ce of income for poor vulnerable households 
serves an important social protection role. Very few policies 
and insn·wnents are available that can claim to cushion the 
poorest in direct and effective ways like remittances have 
shown to be able to do. Also, if the life-cyc le model of 
remittances captw·es the motivation behind remittances then 
it is useful to bear in mind that remittances are sent to 
parents first , siblings next, and only later dedicated to 
building a 'nest egg'(data collected in a 1993-4 survey of 
Tongan migrants in Ausn·alia fully support this pattern). 
Remittances sent to parents are a form of pension payment 
fo·· the parents and one should fully expect to see pension 
payments being spent on consumption rather than 
investment (the investment has already occuned). 
Remittances sent to siblings tend to be devoted to meeting 
their educational needs which should not be viewed the 
same as consumption. 
Of cow-se, positive externalities can exist in investment 
expenditure and it is for this reason that it is considered 
desirable to see remittances funding investment. Efforts to 
identify the causal effect of remittances on investment often 
run into various problems. First, investment is correlated 
with the opportunities that exist, i.e. only counn·ies with 
good investment climates should expect to see remittances 
fund investment. Second, when more enterprising 
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households are the ones sending migrants high investment 
may be v.'fongly associated with high investment due to 
self-selection. Third, remittances are fungible and it is 
difficult to isolate their effects from those of other sow·ces 
of income - simply asking how remittances are spent is 
unlikely to reveal the marginal effect of remittances on 
spending because remittances, even when spent on 
imestment, are likely to free up the marginal dollars for 
conswnption. This is why there is often a difference 
between anecdotal and survey data which show the average 
percentage of spending on consumption and econometric 
data which calculates the marginal propensities by 
modeling remittances as an exogenous positive shock to 
household income. 
In the household surveys conducted in Fiji and Tonga, 
questions on savings were posed directly rather than 
attempting to deduce it from consumption expenditures. 
The results showed that in Fiji, 79% of those who had 
recei\ed remittances had saved, in comparison with 62% of 
those who had not. In Tonga. where over 90% of 
households had received remittances there is still a 
difference, albeit not as great, with 59% of those who 
received remittances having saved versus 52% in the case 
of those who had not received remittances. A relatively 
higher proponion of Indigenous-Fijians in the lowest two 
quintiles had saved and the mean levels of saving in these 
two groups were significantly higher than the levels for 
lndo-Fijians in the same income quintiles. This is consistent 
\\~th the earlier observation that the lndigenous-Fijian 
households in the lower two quintiles received a much 
higher level of remittances than their lndo-Fijian 
counterparts. It would therefore seem that being in receipt 
of remittances at lower ends of the per capita income 
spectrum can make a significant difference to saving. The 
econometric analysis considered both the impact of 
remittances on saving and the influence of saving by the 
household on the levels of remittances it received. It was 
found that in both samples remittances had a strong impact 
on saving, especially among the Fiji sample where the 
estimated marginal propensity to save from remittances was 
73.4%. When the effect of remittances on saving was 
estimated for the two ethnic groups in Fiji it was found that 
the strong remittances effect on saving is associated with 
Indigenous-Fijian households. The analysis also found that 
in lndigenous-Fijian households this relationship runs in 
both directions, indicating that migrants have a higher 
propensity to remit when the household saves more. 
In Tonga e"idence is also found that migration and 
remittances tend to increase income from non-wage sources 
such as business or farm income. This means that 
households with migrants are able to direct resources 
towards business activity. Tongan migrant households very 
often have their members spread across a number of 
acti\ ities and can act as a stimulus and conduit for business 
activity acting as 'transnational corporations of kin'. The 
Fijian results do not tell a similar story. perhaps because the 
remittances are still a relatively early phenomenon. are 
smaller. and are engaged in different occupations from their 
T ongan counterparts. 
Savings and investment may also take different forms. 
Income spent on building human capital should be viewed 
as investment rather than consumption. It is interesting to 
observe the decision of remittance-receiving households in 
determining investments in human capital through 
expenditures on education. In theory, there should be a 
positive impact on the demand for education for two 
reasons: first, the credit constraint on schooling of 
dependents of migrants is reduced when remittances 
become available, and second, the mere possibility of 
migration increases the incentives for investing in schooling 
by raising the return on education. Evidence from the 
Pacific tends to suppon this view5. 
Pot icy Implications 
In order for income distribution to become more equitable 
due to remittances, migration options must be extended to 
the poor and unskilled rather than be reserved for the highly 
skilled or well-off. Many of the poor lack the financial 
resources or social networks to migrate, so programs that 
explicitly target those at lower quintiles of the income 
distribution would yield the greatest benefits. Given social 
and political concerns regarding such migration it will be 
important to balance these benefits with recipient country 
concerns and this balance might be best achieved through 
managed migration programs designed for those who are 
relatively less endowed with wealth or skills. Existing 
literature also suggests that temporary workers remit more 
than permanent, and poor migrants who are not likely to 
travel with their families are likely to remit the most and 
help achieve greater social equality. 
It is not clear whether policy can influence the decision to 
invest or consume at the household level. More importantly, 
it is not even clear whether that is a desirable goal at all, 
since remittances, by funding consumption, are providing 
an important social protection role for the poorest and most 
vulnerable sections of society. Remittances should be 
thought of as any other income and most households will 
expect to fund mostly consumption expenditures at fairly 
low levels of income6 . As income rises, and savings and 
investment opportunities grow, the ability and attractiveness 
of saving will also grow. It may then be desirable to provide 
information to remittance senders and receivers on various 
financial instruments that are available to save and invest 
in. Such non-interventionist policies that remove 
information market asymmetries in the system are likely to 
be helpful in the long run in introducing households to the 
idea of saving. Any improvements in the business 
environment in recipient countries is likely to further 
enhance the positive impacts of remittances so this should 
serve as a reminder that remittances are not a substitute to 
carrying out structw·al reforms, but rather expected to be 
boosted by complementary refonns. 
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There are proposals in some writings for matching grant 
schemes where public funds match remittance funds or 
exceed them by a factor of two or three. Such schemes are 
in practice in some communities in Asia and Latin America 
and are said to be channeling remittances into investment-
like activities and should be commended for delivering 
important services to the community. But from a public 
policy perspective it is not clear whether public resources 
are being diverted away from other and better uses and 
what the rationale is for subsidizing remittances when other 
forms of financial inflows are not subsidized by 
governments. 
iii) Capturing the positive externality from 
migration 
The economic literature has identified and recent 
experience has borne out that there are strong positive 
externalities that arise from the migration of people. The 
influence of the Diaspora in promoting technology transfers 
and knowledge networks acquired abroad by serving as 
"reputational intermediaries" have come to challenge the 
traditional 'brain drain' argwnents put forth against 
migration fi:om developing countries. Anecdotal and 
empirical evidence of this type is increasing for South 
Korea, Taiwan (China) and India. 
However, once workers have been exposed to efficient 
governments and private sectors abroad they can be 
expected to demand an improved incentive environment 
domestically which would enforce greater discipline and 
efficiency on the allocation of internal resources from their 
governments and private sectors at home. A transient 
population of workers rotating between the remote 
developing regions and the developed metropolis is more 
likely to induce demand for better governance within the 
islands whilst cementing closer regional ties. This kind of 
"social remittances" can be a powerful vector of norm 
diffusion with long-term economic consequences' . 
But again, it's important to remind ourselves that these 
positive externalities may also come at a cost- after all, we 
are talking about people who are moving abroad, people 
who are absent from participating in national debates at 
home, people who are unable to write editorials in their 
national newspapers or speak on local radio stations when 
governments are due criticism, people who are not available 
to teach and mentor the next generation, and sometime not 
available to parent their own children. The costs on society 
of these absences are impossible to estimate in any 
economic model but are surely deeply-felt. And these costs 
may change depending on who migrates. If migration is 
skewed towards the skilled it is likely that the costs to 
society are greater than if the unskilled migrate. Estimates 
from the CGE model that experiments with a 1 percent 
positive change to the labor flow (skilled and unskilled) 
from the Pacific islands and Australia and New Zealand 
shows that welfare in the Pacific islands could fall due to 
the loss of skilled labor force and the consequent rise in real 
skilled wages which is not compensated for by the 
increased remittances sent back home8. 
These monetary losses would probably increase by 
multiples if the long term social and institutional costs of 
losing skilled labor alone could be included. Workers who 
have invested in human capital are more likely to affect 
both the supply and demand for institutions. While the 
effect on supply of institution builders is obvious, the effect 
on demand is more subtle because these are the people who 
have the strongest interest in seeing better institutions 
develop as they are the ones having to make the choice to 
leave or stay. 
At a time when institutional quality is front and center in 
discussions on promoting growth and development in the 
Pacific, it is important to understand the impact that 
intemationally mobile hwnan capital has on building 
effective institutions. Although institutions have been 
considered the sin qua non of development, our 
understanding of how successful institutions actually 
develop is still poor. But one could state with reasonable 
certainty that successful institutions depend to a large extent 
on having a critical mass of people with high levels of 
hwnan capital and this is even more likely to be the case in 
the initial stages of a country's economic development. 
Faini (2002) shows that migration, via remittances, 
conttibutes to growth in the migrant-sending country but is 
a declining function of the skilled composition of the 
migrant labor force. This indicates that the negative impact 
from brain drain may not be compensated by a larger flow 
of remittances, hence recommending host counu·ies to limit 
their bias in immigration policies towards skilled labor. 
Anecdotal evidence from the Pacific seems to suggest that 
the loss of the very limited skilled workers poses quite a 
significant problem to the island countries. 
Policy Implications 
From a policy perspective, if social remittances are to serve 
an important role in transforming societies then non-elites 
must have the greatest access to these social remittances. A 
mobile pool of workers that is exposed to developed world 
institutions and able to bring back some of those ideas and 
practices home is likely to serve as a powerful agent of 
change. Hence migration schemes that maintain a steady in-
and-out of non-elite workers is likely to help achieve that 
most usefully. 
In order to give institutions a fair chance of developing in 
the small islands, some balance in the immigration policies 
of developed nations would also be beneficial. While more 
balanced immigration would be fairer and better, even 
selected liberalization of barriers is better than no 
liberalization at all. Very small countries with populations 
of less than a couple of million, may simply lack the 
capabilities necessary to be able to retain talent in many 
sectors. Just as small towns in rich counu·ies find it 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2008 43 
extremely difficult to prevent bright young people from 
leaving, so do small states (Pritchett, 2003). The public 
policy priorities for them are best directed to facilitate the 
movement of talent from these countries to proximate larger 
countries and regional integration of labor markets that can 
help build a critical mass of human capital. Of course, if 
foreign skilled labor wi.sh to work in these small states, their 
entry should be encouraged rather than restricted as is, 
unfortunately, often the case. 
But rather than remove emigration options for those lucky 
enough to have them. it would be better to explore ways for 
more people to share those gains where available. 
B. Migrant-receiving point of view 
i) Increase in amount of resources available 
Migrant receiving developed country markets are expected 
to gain from inward labor mobility because their cun·ent 
endowments favor capital rather than tabor. An influx of 
the scarce factor. labow·, would increase the productivity 
and hence retwns to capital. Through general equilibrium 
modeling it is estimated that developed countries would 
gain $139 billion in real income. CGE modeling for 
Australia and NZ show that an increased inflow of workers 
from the Pacific would increase welfare of residents in 
these countries by $302.61 and $26.5m respectively. Output 
rises in all sectors in Ausu·alia and NZ, with Australia 
gaining most in the elecu·onics sector and NZ in 
manufactw·ing. and both counuies see large improvements 
in their textiles sector output. Most of these gains would 
come not from the movement of ski lied. but rather from 
increases in the supply of unskilled labor. In fact, it is 
possible that the economic benefits of migration for 
developed countries could be even greater than those 
predicted by the models due to factors that have not been 
quantified such as: increased productivity of migrants and 
their futw·e offspring: increased investment levels in 
response to higher retwns to capital and possibly higher 
labor force participation rates among citizens of developed 
counu·ies as support senices become available. 
Low and further declining fettility rates in many developed 
counu·ies are causing higher age dependency ratios and 
have given rise to concems regarding worker deficits to 
deliver services to a grO\ving stock of dependants (young 
and old). ln Australia and NZ. it is estimated that the 
proportion of population that is over the age of 65 is 
expected to more than double between the years 2004-51. 
The demographic projections suggest that the next 40 years 
will see substantial labor shortages in advanced economies 
(McDonald and Kippen. 2000). increasing the pressw·e for 
skilled labor as well as unskilled or semi-skilled labor in 
sectors not fi lied by domestic labour. 
A variety of proposals such as increasing the retirement age 
and inducing more women into the workplace are being 
considered in developed countries. Migration is an option 
which would allow countries to import tax payers as well as 
young workers in the face of labour shortages and aging 
populations, but the levels of immigration required to make 
a dent into these problems may not be considered feasible 
in most countries and hence a variety of policy options wi.ll 
need to be considered properly to understand and prepare 
adequately for the future. 
While migration increases the supply of labor could it drain 
fiscal resources? The fiscal implications of immigration are 
not well understood and remain difficult to quantify. While 
there have been attempts to estimate this for various 
countries, there remain challenges to properly calculating 
the fiscal impact of immigration because it depends heavily 
on: the methodology used which dictates whether the unit 
of analysis is the individual or the household; which 
expenditures and revenues are included; which public 
services are regarded as pure public goods; the extent of 
economies of scale in expenditW'es, the age structure of the 
immigrant populations and their level of skills, education 
and fe11ility. For small numbers of migrants, especially a 
rotating pool of migrants, it does not seem likely that the 
burden on resources would overshadow the large economic 
benefits that are estimated through the CGE model. 
ii) Improvement in allocation of resources 
Enhanced tabor mobility can lead to an improvement in the 
allocation of resources by allowing a better skills-job fit in 
the host country's labor market. Having engineers drive taxi 
cabs or medical students on holiday sign up for performing 
farm labour reduces the overall allocative efficiency in the 
economy. Hence the aim of public policy should be to 
faci I itate a more efficient allocation of human resources 
through flexible labom markets. 
The possibilities that exist for fine-tuning migration policies 
to improve the fit with labor market needs through bilateral 
agreements are numerous and are the focus of various job-
matching programs. Indeed as labour markets tighten and 
the hunt for both specialist and general skills intensifies 
globally, receiving countries will find it in their interest to 
minimize the waste of scarce people resources. A serious 
look at the labour market outcomes for various skill intake 
categories and the effectiveness of job matching assistance 
programs would need to be reviewed. 
iii) Capturing the externality from migration 
While immigration may deliver tangible economic benefits 
to destination countries and make their populations better 
off for the most part, there is usually overt or inherent 
resistance to the idea of increased immigration in developed 
counu·ies. especially of unskilled labor. The concerns 
expressed are either on monetary grounds such as the 
possibility of migrants presenting a fiscal drain on the 
system or taking jobs away from the domestic unskilled 
population; or social grounds regarding the difficulties of 
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integration into destination country societies, the potential 
for overstaying and creating an illegal migrant underclass, 
or the perceived compromise to national security in an 
increasingly security-conscious global environment. But 
such security concerns can work both ways. If failed states 
themselves present a security concern for surrounding 
developed nations then any policy that reduces the fragility 
of these small states - and indeed, of the most vulnerable 
sections of these fragile states - should be considered 
seriously. Urdal (2004), shows that in the presence of a 
preponderance of a young population and low domestic 
employment prospects in a country, the probability of social 
conflict rises unless there is a safety valve ofmigration9 • 
One way to minimize any fiscal or social externalities for 
host countries is to design a temporary movement of 
persons (Ttvfi>) scheme. However, not all Ttvfi> programs 
worldwide have been considered successful and indeed 
some have left lasting memories of exploitative 
relationships or policing of workers to enforce compliance 
with immigration rules, leaving destination counn:ies wary 
of considering such programs again, especially for unskilled 
workers. Given the large potential benefits to the poor from 
the movement of la bow-, it would be a lost oppmtunity to 
let previously ill-designed schemes hold back constructive 
dialogue on this issue today. In fact , past experiences have 
much to offer by way of lessons that could usefully 
influence the design of new programs in the cwTent 
economic context. Two main prescriptions emerge from 
history: the first is the need to ensure incentive compatible 
design so that workers are incentivized to return home at 
the end of the contract period. One way to ensure that 
incentives are properly aligned is to allow circularity of 
access by which good workers are allowed temporary 
access year after year rather than restricting access to a 
short finite period - often justified on the basis of equity 
considerations which hope to spread the gains from access 
to temporary overseas employment to a larger group of 
citizens in source countries. There are also other important 
criteria of incentive compatible design of Ttvfi>s and these 
criteria are explained at length in the World Bank's ' 'at 
Home and Away' repmt released in 2006. The second 
major lesson that emerges from the past experience is the 
need to acknowledge and explicitly address the issue of 
time-inconsistency that arises from the investments made in 
temporary workers in the host country which later on makes 
it difficult to ensure temporariness and ends up 
undermining such schemes. Given how much the integrity 
of Ttvfi>s depends on ensuring temporariness I explore this 
further in the final section. 
The Bane of TMP: the time inconsistency 
problem and the conflict of interest between 
source and host countries 
This is best understood if we think of migration as a two-
stage game. 10 Migrants enter the host country in the first 
stage where host country firms can choose to train the 
immigrants. The cost of training is mostly incurred in the 
first stage and hence treated as a sunk cost, however the 
benefit from it accrues in the second stage 11• However once 
immigrants are trained the cost is sunk and it becomes 
desirable for the host to want to retain them permanently. 
So while firms may initially patticipate in such programs 
accepting the temporary nature of the atTangements in time 
period t+ 1, such an arrangement is not in their interest in 
time period t+2. This results in too much petmanent 
migration and too little temporary migration - as has 
happened with numerous Ttvfi>s. For unskilled workers the 
social costs are considered greater than the private training 
costs incurred by firms so the wedge between private and 
socially desirable policy can be sizeable which explains the 
current impasse on Ttvfi> where destination countries 
sometimes prefer a 'no-migration ' scenario altogether. In 
cases where the net benefit from training is small relative to 
the social cost (usually skilled occupations) source 
countries prefer temporary migration but the destination 
countries might prefer permanent migration. Some TMPs 
designed for skilled populations - like the US specialty 
occupation visa - are intended to be de facto pennanent 
migration schemes where the temporary phase serves the 
role of screening out the non-settlers. In such a case there 
could be a direct conflict of interest between source and 
host countries who each want a different outcome from the 
"temporary" migration program. 
The table below is an attempt to map out the possible 
scenarios that emerge with varying levels of private fixed 
costs and social costs. 
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Table 1 
Social cost is high 
Social cost is low 
Policy emphasis needed 
to make TMP work 
Fixed cost is high 
Finns want P. 
SG probably wants P. 
HG wants T. 
PROBLEM AREA! 
domestically and 
internationally 
Firms want P. 
SG wants T. 
HG wants P. 
If HG and F collude, 
commitment problem. 
Onus on firms- credible ex 
post action will be important. 
Fixed cost is low 
Firms can doT. 
SG probably wants P. 
HG wants T. 
PROBLEM AREA BUT 
domestic cooperation 
possible 
Either outcome acceptable 
Policy emphasis needed to 
make TMP work 
Onus on SG to screen, 
regulate, repatriate. 
Need mechanisms to get SG 
cooperation 
Burden on HG 
Need mechanisms to get 
HG to cooperate 
Note: Fixed cost= selection, training. travel; SG =source country; HG =host country; P = permanent migration; T =temporary migration 
This initial thinking is presented in the context of Australia 
and New Zealand's recent participation in TMPs for the 
Pacific islands. Fonnal M&E efforts are underway and will 
attempt to quantify the development impact on source 
countries as well as the effectiveness of accompanying 
facilitati\'e measures. The above discussions provide a 
framework for analyzing these effects and also highlights 
the importance of not only getting the design right in the 
first place but also of staying carefully focused on the need 
to bui ld mechanisms that invoke cooperation between 
hiring fu·ms, workers, source and host governments. 
Ignoring this aspect during implementation not only risks 
potential domestic backlash to such immigration in host 
countries but seriously stymies the economic opportunities 
available to the region's most vulnerable populations. 
Notes 
I. The assumption is that the overall stock of workers 
in high income countries would go up by 3 percent, 
implying mobility of 14.2 million workers from 
developing to high-income countries by 2025. 
Source: Global Economic Prospects. World Bank. 
2005. 
2. Causality with adversity at the household level is 
hard to establish from data usually because of the 
likelihood of reverse causality where remittance 
3. 
4. 
5. 
rece1vmg households can mitigate adversity better 
(better nutrition, frequent health checks). 
Previously collected and analysed data from Samoa 
is also available. 
Or where the income effect is smaller than the 
substitution effect. 
The results from the Pacific give empirical support 
to the above hypothesis. Primary and secondary 
education to age 14 in Tonga is compulsory and free. 
It is possibly for this reason that there was little 
variability in educational attainment, and the 
econometric analysis indicated that migration and 
remittance effects were not evident. In Fiji, eight 
years of education is supplied by the government but 
it is not compulsory. This probably explains why 
there is considerably more variation in the education 
attainment in the Fiji sample1• The analysis showed 
that remittances are associated with better 
educational attainment at the secondary level (by 
alleviating the budget constraint). In the second part 
of the econometric analysis the impact of household 
migration on post-secondary education for both Fiji 
and Tonga was assessed. It was found that having a 
migrant (rather than remittances) in the household 
increased the likelihood of other household members 
acquiring post-secondary education (by inducing 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
investment in education). The relationship is 
stronger in Fiji where the remaining family members 
have an incentive to undertake further investments in 
education due to the size of the domestic economy 
and also have access to domestic education 
institutions in Fij~ which is less likely to be the case 
in Tonga. These findings are relevant from a policy 
perspective for they indicate that any potential 
negative brain-drain effects of migration could, to 
some extent, be countered by larger investments in 
education by remittance-receiving households. 
Depending on the temporal properties of income, the 
mental accounting of how this income is spent could 
vary. 
"Give us your Best and Brightest'' (2005). 
Experience of the Moroccan migrants in Egypt who 
took on Egyptian fertility rates went against the 
predictions in the 1970s of demographers who were 
estimating a sharp decline in fertility in Egypt and 
only a gradual one in Morocco. Two decades later 
the opposite had occurred despite higher rates of 
economic growth and levels of education in Egypt, 
signalling a transfer of '·values'' particularly to the 
second generation of Moroccan-origin emigrants in 
Europe. Mexican data also showed how emigration 
can expose non-elite family members to the 
preferences of foreign country. A panel study of 
political attitudes in a cross-section of Mexico· s 
population prior to the country's elections in 2000 
questioned some 2,400 respondents about their party 
affiliation, their views on various political issues, 
and details about their families. This study revealed 
that those with relatives in the United States were 
more 'neoliberal' that those without similar 
connections. 
These results are at odds with global evidence where 
even the movement of skilled labom increases 
welfare, although emigration of unskilled labour 
increases welfare by much more for the sending 
country. The difference may be emerging from the 
fact that in the global exercises, much of the labour 
movement is emerging from large developing 
countries that may either have an over-supply of 
skilled workers to start with, or can quickly make up 
the loss and hence attenuate the rise in wages of 
skilled labour. 
9. In the Pacific, fertility rates are high and appear to be 
coming down only slowly contributing to the 
projected population growth of as much as 2.5 
percent p.a. Even under assumptions of faster 
declines, significant population growth rates will 
continue for many years because of the population 
momentum that has been built up. Melanesia in 
particular, which is characterized by high fertility 
rates, low formal sector employment and very 
limited migration options, will generate the highest 
proportion of excess labor. For example, in Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu where formal sector 
employment is already among the lowest in the 
region, the working age populations are expected to 
increase by another 30 percent within the next 
decade. While some domestic employment 
opportunities will also be created, it would still leave 
nearly 90 percent of the populations of these 
countries outside the formal sector. Estimates 
indicate that over 370,000 people in Fiji, 279,000 in 
the Solomon Islands and 129,000 in Vanuatu would 
not be able to find formal sector employment in their 
countries by 2015. 
10. Am in and Mattoo (2006) 
11. Depending upon the nature of social preferences. 
training technology and the skill of migrants several 
outcomes are possible. 
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